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BALANCING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING’S
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS:
THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
FEDERAL BASELINE AND THE PROVISION
OF LOCAL RIGHTS
ADAM GARMEZY†
I. INTRODUCTION
Hydraulic fracturing, or “hydrofracking,” describes the process
wherein fluid is pumped underground at extremely high pressure to
1
drive out oil or natural gas. Although first developed in the 1940s,
hydrofracking did not begin to revolutionize the U.S. energyextraction industry until 1998, when, for the first time, it was used in
2
conjunction with horizontal drilling. This combination of
technologies provided for resource extraction from previously
3
uneconomical shale basins—dubbed “unconventional” reserves —
prompting a rapid proliferation in the number of natural gas wells
4
constructed across the United States. For example, in Pennsylvania’s
Marcellus shale formation alone, 196 wells were drilled in 2008, 763 in
5
6
2009, 1,386 in 2010, and an astronomical 3,500 are projected by

†
Adam Garmezy is a J.D. Candidate in the Class of 2014 at Duke University School of
Law; B.A., Amherst College, magna cum laude, 2011. He would like to thank his friends for
their encouragement and the DELPF editorial staff for their considerable effort and guidance.
1. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 115 (2009).
2. The first coupling of hydrofracking and horizontal drilling occurred in 1998 in Texas’s
Barnett Shale play. PHILIPPE A. CHARLEZ, ROCK MECHANICS: PETROLEUM APPLICATIONS
239 (Editions Technip, 2d ed. 1997). See also Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism:
Support for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L.
& POL’Y 913, 919 (2011).
3. Sarah K. Adair et al., Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North Carolina: Lessons
from Other States, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 257, 261 (2012).
4. William J. Sutherland et al., Horizon Scan of Global Conservation Issues for 2011, 26
TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 10, 14 (2011).
5. Kara Brasier & Melissa Ward, Accelerating Activity in the Marcellus Shale: An Update
on Wells Drilled and Permitted, PENN. ST. COLL. AGRIC. SCI: PENN. ST. EXTENSION (May 16,
2010), http://extension.psu.edu/naturalgas/news/2010/05/accelerating-activity.
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2020. The practice of hydraulic fracturing is expanding so hurriedly
that even residents of urbanized areas are subject to the possibility of
“twenty-four hour drilling disrupting the tranquility” of their
8
backyards.
Currently, a schism exists between energy lobbyists: one extreme
believes that natural gas provides the key to America’s energy future;
the other clamors that hydrofracking should be completely eradicated
because of its potential to cause environmental degradation. Because
of America’s increasing demand for energy, policymakers need to
find a middle ground, allowing for increased energy production while
minimizing environmental risk. This paper argues that the federal
government is the best entity to govern this tension between
increasing extraction and environmental protectionism.
Part II provides a brief technical description of hydrofracking.
Part III reviews the historical evolution of hydrofracking law in an
effort to better frame the current state of energy policy. Part IV
explores the environmental concerns associated with hydrofracking;
Part V evaluates its economic benefits. Lastly, Part VI argues for a
comprehensive, federal regulatory baseline to govern hydraulicfracturing policy, supplemented by local rights that can extend
beyond this baseline.
II. WHAT IS HYDROFRACKING?
Hydrofracking has revolutionized the energy industry by
9
allowing drillers to reach previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits.
Using the coupling of hydrofracking and horizontal drilling, widely
dispersed oil and gas reserves can be extracted from tight, low-

6. Marcellus Shale–Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play: New Research Results Surprise
Everyone on the Potential of this Well-Known Devonian Black Shale, GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
7. Sutherland, supra note 4, at 14.
8. Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas Municipal Oil and
Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349, 354
(2007). In the Barnett Shale region of Texas, new homeowners often purchase property without
being cognizant of the fact that drilling companies can re-enter their property and re-stimulate
the well for production. The “core area” of the Barnett formation, the Newark East Field, lies
beneath the densely populated Wise, Denton, Tarrant, and Dallas counties. Id.
9. Jason Obold, Leading by Example: The Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of
Chemicals Act of 2011 as a Catalyst for International Drilling Reform, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 473, 475–76 (2012). In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court noted that “[t]he success of
the Barnett Shale production zone has spurred efforts to produce gas in many other areas and
geological formulations that were previously considered unrecoverable or uneconomic.” Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 32 (Tex. 2008) (citation omitted).
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10

permeability geologic areas. Fluid cocktails are injected into the
subsurface at extremely high pressures, which causes the alreadyexisting fracture networks to expand and also creates new fissures.
This expanded fracture network gives previously trapped
11
hydrocarbons an avenue to reach the wellbore. The contents of the
fluid cocktail differ depending upon the precise geology of the area
and the hydrocarbon to be extracted, but water and sand are two
primary ingredients for any given fracturing operation, and are
usually supplemented by various solvents, including hydrochloric acid
12
or diesel fuel.
The process of injecting the fracking fluid stimulates the cracking
of the subsurface geology. Next, the sand (or a similar substance)
flows into the cracks and props them open—the substance, when used
13
in this way, is referred to as a “proppant” —providing a longer
14
duration for the desired hydrocarbon to reach the wellbore.
Approximately nine to thirty-five percent of the fracking fluid flows
back up the wellbore—referred to as the “flowback”—for around two
15
weeks after the initial fracturing. The rest of the fracking fluid
16
remains in the earth’s subsurface.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF HYDROFRACKING LAW AND POLICY
A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the “Halliburton Loophole”

17

18

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempted hydrofracking from
19
the majority of the existing environmental regulatory framework.

10. Wiseman, supra note 1, at 122.
11. Obold, supra note 9, at 478.
12. Wiseman, supra note 1, at 118.
13. Id. Proppants are “granular substances injected into the formation to hold or ‘prop’
open coal formation fractures,” typically sand. OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING
WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 4-1
(2004), available at http://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/evaluation_of_impacts_to_
underground_sources_of_drinking_water_by_hydraulic_fracturing_of_coalbed_methane_reserv
oirs.pdf.
14. Wiseman, supra note 1, at 118–19.
15. Powers, supra note 2, at 920.
16. Id.
17. Elisabeth N. Radow, Homeowners and Gas Drilling Leases: Boon or Bust?, 83 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 10, 12 (2011) (explaining that the exemption from federal environmental regulation for
hydrofracking is “commonly known as the Halliburton loophole”).
18. Energy Policy Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-58, 119 STAT. 594 (2005).
19. Powers, supra note 2, at 938–39.
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Congress stated that the hydrofracking exemption would increase the
20
country’s potential to reach the goal of energy independence, but
critics remain skeptical as to the legislature’s true motivation for the
21
exemptions. In fact, the skepticism regarding the exemptions for
hydrofracking was so pervasive that certain “dubious provisions” in
the 2005 Energy Policy Act became known as the “Halliburton
22
loophole.”
President George W. Bush created the National Energy Policy
Development Group less than three weeks after taking office, and
23
appointed Vice President Dick Cheney to chair the task force. The
group held dozens of meetings discussing energy policy, only one of
24
which involved the participation of environmental interest groups.
Its ultimate recommendations “were greatly influenced, [and] often
25
directly drafted, by [the oil and gas] industry.” Emails revealed that
the group “adopted verbatim” numerous American Petroleum
26
Institute (API) suggestions. These heavily industry-influenced
recommendations, coming from the National Energy Policy
Development Group, formed the basis for the Energy Policy Act of
27
2005, fostering the skepticism previously mentioned.
Section 322 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)—which purports to protect public
water supplies from hazardous substances and underground
injection—to exclude “the underground injection of natural gas for
28
purposes of storage” and “the underground injection of fluids or
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A28
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html?scp=1&sq=halliburton+
loophole&st=nyt (noting that one of the provisions in the 2005 Energy Act was “dubbed the
Halliburton Loophole”).
22. See id. (claiming that the “dubious provisions” were “inserted at the behest of—you
guessed it—then-Vice President Dick Cheney, a former chief executive of Halliburton”). On
March 17, 1949, the first two commercial hydrofracking jobs were performed by Halliburton.
Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an Enduring
Technology, 62 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (2010), available at http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/
archives/2010/12/10Hydraulic.pdf.
23. Obold, supra note 9, at 483. The group was dominated by the energy industry, with the
primary members coming from energy companies such as Exxon, Enron, and lobbyists from the
American Petroleum Institute. Eric Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the Cloistering of
the Cheney Energy Task Force, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 331 (2008).
24. Dannenmaier, supra note 23, at 331.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Obold, supra note 9, at 483–84.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
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propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
29
activities.” Section 322 overturned an opinion in which the Eleventh
Circuit held that Part C of the SDWA required the Environmental
30
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate hydraulic fracturing activities.
Additionally, the Energy Policy Act “effectively exempted wellpad
construction activities associated with hydrofracking from the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under
31
the [Clean Water Act],” because the CWA exempts “[s]tormwater
runoff from oil, gas, and mining operations” from permitting
32
requirements.
Because many states choose not to regulate hydrofracking
pursuant to the SDWA even when diesel is used in the fracking fluid,
the SDWA fails to provide any meaningful environmental protection
33
for fracturing operations in much of the United States. However, in
2003, BJ Services Co., Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and
Schlumberger Technology Corp. voluntarily agreed with the EPA to
remove diesel fuel from the fracturing fluids “injected into coalbed
methane production wells in underground sources of drinking water,”
34
but did not agree to remove diesel fuel from other operations.
Even before Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
hydrofracking was exempt from the Resource Conservation and
35
Recovery Act (RCRA), which regulates hazardous-waste disposal,
and from reporting requirements for toxic substances pursuant to the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
29. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
30. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478
(11th Cir. 1997).
31. Powers, supra note 2, at 939.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2006).
33. For example, “regulations applicable in Louisiana (like those in most states) have
never been used to regulate fracturing, even when the fracking fluid contains diesel.” Keith B.
Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: What are the Legal Issues?, 59 LA. B.J. 250, 251 (2012).
34. Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and Federal Legislation and Regulation of
Hydraulic
Fracturing,
57
ADVOC.
(TEX.)
31,
31
(2011),
available
at
http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate_Vol57_Winter2011.pdf.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this subsection, drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the
exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy shall
be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory programs in lieu of this subchapter.”).
The EPA then fully exempted wastes associated with the production of crude oil, natural gas,
and geothermal energy in 1988. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal
Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,447 (July 6, 1988)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (2010)).
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(EPCRA). In addition, the EPA “will not aggregate air emissions
from the various operations that occur on a wellpad, and the agency
has exempted pollutants emitted by surface waste, like fracking fluid,
37
from stationary source regulation” under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
With these numerous environmental exemptions, and with
technological advances allowing for more efficient production, the
United States has witnessed an explosion of hydrofracking:
production of natural gas was level between 1996 and 2006, but once
38
“fracking suddenly caught on . . . output has climbed steadily.”
B. Current Federal Oversight of Hydrofracking
Even
with
hydrofracking’s
widespread
environmental
39
exemptions, it does not completely escape federal oversight. For
example, states still must comply with the CWA’s water-quality
standards, and they still must satisfy the CAA’s national ambient air
40
quality standards.
Specifically, the CWA provides federal oversight for the disposal
of wastewater through sewer systems of publicly owned treatment
facilities, as these mechanisms for disposal are “navigable waters” of
41
the United States. However, the Supreme Court’s current
understanding of “navigable waterways,” opined in Justice Kennedy’s
42
concurrence in Rapanos v. United States, dictates that jurisdiction
under the CWA only arises if a “significant nexus” exists between
43
federal navigable waters and an affected groundwater connection.
Because most of hydrofracking’s probable impacts on groundwater
are hard to trace to navigable waters—it is currently very difficult to
assess the amount and direction that the fracking fluid travels within

36. Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 229, 250 n.125 (2010).
37. Powers, supra note 2, at 940–41.
38. Mark Perry, U.S. Natural Gas Production Hits All-Time High, REAL CLEAR ENERGY
(July 5, 2011), http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2011/07/05/us_natural_gas_production_
at_all_time_high_106236.html. Additionally, although Mark Perry does not point to this
correlation, it is important to note hydrofracking’s rapid increase beginning in 2006 and the
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 18–38.
40. Powers, supra note 2, at 940.
41. See Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 32.
42. 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006).
43. Powers, supra note 2, at 940.
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the subsurface—satisfying the “significant nexus” requirement for the
44
underground injection of fluids is nearly impossible.
Even though hydrofracking is exempted from the definition of
45
“underground injection” within the SDWA, § 1431(a) provides the
EPA with authority to “take such actions [deemed to be] necessary in
order to protect [public] health . . . [n]otwithstanding any other
provision[s] of this subchapter,” which includes hydrofracking’s
46
explicit exemptions specified in 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B). For
example, § 1431(a) permits the EPA to compel companies to provide
a potable water replacement for those possessing polluted personal
water wells, to install explosivity meters, to mandate the surveying
and sampling of all domestic wells within a circumscribed area, to
take soil samples, and to eliminate gas flow pathways that could reach
47
aquifers or other potential water supplies.
For air quality, EPA’s regulation of fracking is rooted in the 2010
48
consent decree resulting from WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson. That
decree, issued by the D.C. Circuit, required the EPA to regulate air
emissions of oil and gas facilities “under CAA section 112(f)(2)” by
49
January 31, 2011. Pursuant to the court’s holding, the EPA is
requiring new source performance standards for volatile organic
50
compounds and sulfur dioxide for new and existing wells.
Additionally, the EPA is suggesting that for natural gas processing
plant valves, there should be a tightening of what constitutes a
51
“leak.”
Although the EPA is currently working on a framework of
federal permitting guidelines for fracking operations using diesel
52
fuels, the oil and gas industry has indicated that they may contest
44. Id. at 940 n.169.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (excluding from the definition of underground injection
“the underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage” and “the underground
injection of fluids or propping agents . . . pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations”).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2006) (excluding “the underground injection of natural gas for
purposes of storage” and “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than
diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations . . .”).
47. See Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 35–36 (discussing the EPA’s rights under the
SDWA).
48. Consent Decree, WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, Case 1:09-cv-00089-CK (D.D.C.
Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.jacksonkelly.com/jk/pdf/C2110376.PDF.
49. Id. at 3–4.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The EPA has authority to regulate underground injection of diesel pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
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future EPA regulations for being “overly broad.” Likewise, some
states, such as North Dakota, have expressed concerns that EPA’s
forthcoming rules might overburden states and provide an
impediment to the thriving natural gas economy, and have indicated
54
that they might bring suit if the EPA finalizes the regulations. North
Dakota’s reaction to potential federal oversight is indicative of
current regulation of hydrofracking in many states throughout the
country—big oil and gas companies drill with minimal environmental
55
regulations, and widespread industry opposition will render
meaningful change deeply challenging.
C. Major Proposed Federal Legislation: The FRAC Act
In response to growing concerns about the environmental
impacts of fracking and increasing public awareness of the lack of
56
regulatory oversight governing hydrofracking, in 2009 the Fracturing
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act) was
57
proposed for debate in both the House of Representatives and the
58
59
Senate. The bill was reintroduced in 2011, again in both the House
60
and Senate, but Congress has yet to act affirmatively on the
61
proposal. The FRAC Act would overhaul the current regulatory
scheme overseeing hydrofracking by repealing its exemption in the

53. Sorrell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the Regulation
of Natural Gas Activities, ZONING & PLAN L. REP. Feb. 2012, at 1, 2.
54. North Dakota’s particular concern is federal regulation that would require permitting
for petroleum distillates that make-up less than one-percent of fracking fluid used in the Bakken
oil shale in western North Dakota. North Dakota Eyes Suit if EPA Pursues Broad Definition of
Diesel Fracking, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Nov. 11, 2011, at 30.
55. See infra Part VI.
56. Television shows, documentaries such as Gasland, dramatized cinema such as the
impending “Promised Land,” and newspaper articles have begun to publically broadcast the
environmental concerns with hydrofracking. See, e.g., Matt Damon Fracking Film Lights Up
Petroleum Lobby, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/video/video.aspx?vid=Matt-DamonFracking-Film-Lights-Up-Petroleum-Lobby-5jac00046 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
57. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009, H.R. 2766, 111th
Cong. (2009).
58. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th
Cong. (2009).
59. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 112th
Cong. (2011).
60. FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011).
61. The bill in the House and Senate has the status of “Died (Referred to Committee)” as
of November 20, 2012. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R.
th
1084, 112 Cong. (as introduced by House, Mar. 15, 2011); FRAC Act, S. 587 112th Cong. (as
introduced by Senate, Mar. 15, 2011).
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SDWA and by requiring disclosure of fracturing chemicals. This
change would require the EPA to undertake the “inspection,
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements” pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 330h(b)(1)(c), which would require all drillers to prove
that their fracking fluids will not endanger potable water supplies
before they could obtain an Underground Injection Control permit
63
and begin their fracturing job.
The disclosure portion of the FRAC Act would require
distributing to the public a list of the “chemical constituents” used in
fracking fluid, but not the proportions used, as those are considered
64
“proprietary chemical formulas.” If necessary during a public-health
emergency, even the proprietary formulas would have to be disclosed
65
(though not to the public). The oil and gas lobby, fearful that the
leaking of their trade secrets and proprietary information will
66
diminish profits, have vehemently opposed the FRAC Act.
IV. MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS WITH HYDROFRACKING
Questions regarding hydrofracking’s environmental impacts have
begun to radiate throughout the country, and many lawsuits over
those impacts—particularly over water contamination—have been
67
filed, asserting common law tort claims.
These growing
environmental concerns are driving some states to impose
moratoriums on fracking pending further research on its

62. Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33. The bills propose including “the underground
injection of fluids or propping agents pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil,
gas, or geothermal production activities” within the definition of “underground injection” in the
SDWA. H.R. 1084, § 2(a); S. 587, § 2(a).
63. Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33.
64. H.R. 1084, § 2(b); S. 587, § 2(b).
65. “Whenever the State or the Administrator, or a treating physician or nurse, determines
that a medical emergency exists and the proprietary chemical formula of a chemical used in
hydraulic fracturing operations is necessary for medical treatment, the person conducting the
hydraulic operations shall, upon request, immediately disclose the proprietary chemical
formulas or the specific chemical identity of a trade secret chemical to the State, the
Administrator or treating physician.” H. R. 1084, § 2(b); S. 587, § 2(b).
66. During 2009 and 2010 Energy in Depth, an oil and gas group backed by “some of the
largest oil companies on the planet, such as Chevron, BP, Shell, and Occidental, along with the
American Petroleum Institute and other trade associations” spent $126.8 million on lobbying.
Big Oil Front Group Poured Millions into Lobby Against Fracking Regulation,
POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://www.polluterwatch.com/blog/big-oil-frontgroup-poured-millions-lobby-against-fracking-regulation.
67. Joe Schremmer, Comment, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict
Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216–17 (2012).
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environmental impacts, and driving countries such as France,
Switzerland, and South Africa to enact nationwide hydrofracking
69
bans. This section will provide an overview of the most prominent
environmental concerns related to hydrofracking: water
contamination; water usage; greenhouse-gas emissions; seismic
disturbance; and the loss of pristine wilderness.
A. Water Contamination
In 2004, the EPA “concluded that the injection of hydraulic
fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells pose[d] little or no
70
threat” to underground sources of drinking water. However, because
most formations fracture vertically, chemical leakage from
hydrocarbon formations to above aquifers remains a major concern
71
notwithstanding the EPA’s 2004 findings. Furthermore, although
approximately nine to thirty-five percent of the fracking flowback
returns to the wellbore, the rest remains buried within the earth’s
72
subsurface, leading to concern that the flowback could move toward
the surface, through either well-casing cracks or fissures in the rock,
and contaminate local groundwater reserves and consequently,
73
drinking water supply.
The EPA announced that this risk of groundwater contamination
is minimal because fracking fluid contains only a small concentration
of toxic chemicals, effective fluid-recovery techniques can reduce the
amount of fracking fluid left underground, and the rock surrounding
74
the fractures can absorb much of what remains. The shale strata is
believed to act as an effective barrier to fluid migration because shale
75
formations have low permeability, and there is typically over a
vertical mile of rock sitting between the horizontal fracturing zone

68. For example, New York has a moratorium on fracking near the New York City and
Syracuse watersheds, New Jersey has imposed a moratorium on hydrofracking throughout the
state, and Maryland instituted a three-year moratorium. Negro, supra note 53, at 9.
69. Id.
70. Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1224.
71. Id. at 1221.
72. Powers, supra note 2, at 920.
73. See id. (writing that “[t]he rest remains below the earth’s surface and has the potential
to move through cracks in well casings or the target substrate into surrounding rock and
eventually to migrate into and contaminate groundwater sources for waterways and drinking
supplies”).
74. Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1221–22.
75. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at ES-17 (“The low permeability of
relatively unfractured shale . . .”).
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and the aquifers above. Even the fact that shale “must be
hydraulically fractured to produce fluids” has been proffered as
77
evidence that migration is not a major concern.
The apprehension over the large proportion of the flowback
remaining nestled underground is somewhat abated by the unique
chemical properties of shale, as shale is generally chemically reactive
78
with high water-content fluids. Over-time, when the water contacts
the shale, the two substances form a viscous slurry that eventually is
believed to seal the fissures within the rocks, inhibiting flowback
79
migration.
However, because the fissures are not sealed
instantaneously, an avenue still exists for the fracking fluid to flow
toward the surface via any vertical fissures. In geologic regions with
thinner shale beds, water contamination would seem to be more
likely.
A 2011 study conducted by the Nicholas School for the
Environment at Duke University found “no evidence of
80
contamination from chemical-laden fracking fluids.” Nevertheless,
methane levels were “17 times higher on average in wells located
within a kilometer of active hydrofracking sites,” and the methane
observed at these wells was of the type that is indicative of methane
formed at high temperature and pressure deep underground—the
81
methane typically released by drilling and hydrofracking operations.
Although it is important to realize that the data only exhibits a
sizeable correlation, the study strongly suggests that drilling and
hydrofracking contributes to water contamination, albeit not from the
fracking fluids themselves.

76. Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1222.
77. See Sy Gruza, Will NYSDEC’s Proposed Regulations Prevent the Potential Significant
Adverse Impacts of Fracking?, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,331, 10,334 (2012)
(“The fact that the shales must be hydraulically fractured to produce fluids is evidence that
these rocks do not readily transmit fluid.”).
78. Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1222.
79. Id.
80. Tim Lucas, Methane Levels 17 Times Higher in Water Wells Near Hydrofracking Sites,
NICHOLAS SCH. OF THE ENV’T (May 9, 2011), http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
hydrofracking/methane-levels-17-times-higher-in-water-wells-near-hydrofracking-sites.
81. Id. Wells closer to active hydrofracking sites “had a different isotopic footprint,” and
were made up of thermogenic methane, “which is formed at high temperatures deep
underground and is captured in gas wells during hydrofracking” as opposed to biogenic
methane, which is not associated with hydrofracking and “is produced at shallower depths and
lower temperatures.” Id.
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82

In 2011, pursuant to CERCLA § 104(e), which authorizes the
EPA to monitor hydrofracking operations because of the
83
nonpetroleum-based fluids used in the fracking fluid, the EPA
decided it was time to reinvestigate the connection between water
84
contamination and hydrofracking. The EPA inspected the alleged
groundwater contamination in the Pavillion Gas Field of Wyoming,
85
and published a draft report of its findings (a final report is not
86
expected until 2014). The EPA findings differed dramatically from
87
their 2004 conclusions.
The 2011 draft concluded that “inorganic and organic
constituents associated with hydraulic fracturing have contaminated
ground water at and below the depth used for [the] domestic water
88
supply.” This conclusion was tempered somewhat by the distinctive
geology of the Pavillion Gas Field, which consists of “thin
discontinuous sandstone units” possessing “little lateral and vertical
continuity to hydraulically fracture tight sandstones and no lithologic
barrier (lateral continuous shale units) to stop upward vertical
89
migration of aqueous constituents of hydraulic fracturing.”
Additionally, extending the casing below the “maximum depth of
domestic wells in the area” and using more cement may help alleviate
90
fluid migration. Nevertheless, residents living in the area of
Pavillion, Wyoming were advised to avoid drinking from their wells

82. “Whenever the President is authorized to act pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,
or whenever the President has reason to believe that a release has occurred or is about to occur,
or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributable to exposure to a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant and that a release may have occurred or be occurring, he
may undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information
gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of the
release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or
contaminants involved . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (2005).
83. Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33.
84. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, No.600/D-11/001, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 1
(2011).
85. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER
CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING (2011) (responding to complaints made by well
owners regarding drinking water contamination by conducting a study on the contributing
factors of the contamination).
86. Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1223.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 70–94 (discussing the findings of the EPA).
88. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 85, at 39.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 38.
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91

because of the hydrocarbons detected in the water supply.
Notwithstanding the EPA’s conclusion that hydrofracking was
92
contributing to water pollution, Matt Mead, the governor of
Wyoming at the time, delayed the release of the EPA’s findings so
93
state officials and energy juggernauts could “coordinate an ‘all-out94
press’ against the EPA.” Wyoming’s response suggests that oil- and
gas-rich states may prefer to be willfully blind, prioritizing the
economic benefits of hydrofracking over open disclosure and safety.
The risk of water-supply contamination is greater in regions with
more “brittle” geology—rock formations already containing many
faults and fractures that can “serve as conduits that facilitate
migration of contaminants, methane, or pressurized fluids from deep
95
formations towards the surface.” In water-rich states, where
groundwater connections are widespread, migration is particularly
96
problematic. For example, because of the particular geology of the
Catskill region’s bedrock, hydrofracking in upstate New York could
97
be highly dangerous to the New York City watershed. The Catskill
region contains brittle geological features and in some areas, no
vertical distance exists between New York’s water infrastructure and
98
the Marcellus formation (the location of the gas to be extracted).
As discussed above, most of the water used during fracturing
remains underground, and only about nine to thirty-five percent
99
returns to the surface. Many states are struggling to dispose of the
wastewater safely, and approaches vary by region. Although
wastewater disposal is regulated nationally under the CWA and

91. Negro, supra note 53, at 5.
92. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 85, at 39.
93. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Encana Calls B.S. on EPA’s Wyoming Gas Fracking
Study, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/
encana-calls-b-s-on-epas-wyoming-gas-fracking-study/ (calling some of Encana Oil & Gas’s
criticisms “downright funny in their suggestion that the agency bungled not just its testing
approach, but the test samples themselves”).
94. Wyoming Pushed EPA to Delay Study on Fracking: Report, REUTERS (May 3, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/us-usa-fracking-epa-idUSBRE8421K920120503.
95. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT: IMPACT
ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN THE NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY
WATERSHED 13 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/
12_23_2009_final_assessment_report.pdf.
96. Powers, supra note 2, at 925.
97. Id.
98. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 95, at 13–20 (describing New York’s
geological features).
99. Powers, supra note 2, at 920.
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SDWA, there are a wide array of methods that satisfy the national
regulatory standard. In western states the common practice is to inject
100
the flowback into underground reservoirs. Most eastern states do
not have the proper geology for underground injection and cannot
treat the waste at municipal treatment plants, so they often dispose of
101
wastewater into lined pits or ponds. If not done properly, this can
lead to surface pollution. Indeed, due to increasing amounts of
wastewater in his state’s rivers, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett
asked the EPA to develop federal regulations for “pretreating”
102
wastewater. Likewise, wastewater pollution concerns led the New
Jersey legislature to ban “the treatment or storage of fracking waste
in the state,” though the bill was vetoed by Governor Chris Christie,
who instead imposed a one-year moratorium on fracking to further
103
study the issue.
It is important to note that groundwater contamination can also
104
occur from poorly constructed domestic water wells. Because
drinking-water wells are not subject to the same oversight and
scrutiny as corporate operations, the casing on the water wells may
105
not extend deeply enough to protect the water supply. These poorly
designed wells can allow contaminated surface water to flow into the
106
water well and pollute the entire underlying aquifer.
More
unexpectedly, older, undisclosed wells can contribute to surface
pollution because when subterranean methane pockets are released,
the methane can escape to the surface—which can even take the form
107
of a weeklong, thirty-foot methane-laced geyser. Many water wells

100. Negro, supra note 53, at 6.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 6–7.
103. Mireya Navarro, New Jersey Senate Bans Treatment of Fracking Waste, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/new-jersey-senate-banstreatment-of-fracking-waste/.
104. ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40894, UNCONVENTIONAL
GAS SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 26 (2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40894_20091030.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Id. “In such instances, and particularly where natural gas drilling and stimulation
activities are nearby, leaky surface impoundments or careless surface disposal or drilling fluids
at the natural gas operation could increase the risk of contaminating the nearby water well . . . “
Id.
107. Scott Detrow, Perilous Pathways: How Drilling Near an Abandoned Well Produced a
Methane Geyser, NPR (Oct. 9, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/
2012/10/09/perilous-pathways-how-drilling-near-an-abandoned-well-produced-a-methanegeyser/.
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were created before permits were required, and therefore it is nearly
108
impossible to be certain that a fracking site is completely well-free.
The risk of groundwater pollution is heightened because federal law
exempts the construction or operation of oil and gas operations from
109
the CWA, although states can regulate within this federal void.
B. The Large Quantity of Water Required for Hydrofracking
Lower estimates publicize that two to four million gallons of
110
water are required to fracture a horizontal well and higher estimates
111
announce the number to be between four and eight million gallons.
112
The fact that wells can be fractured multiple times greatly increases
the amount of water used at each drilling site. Even though
hydrofracking uses millions of gallons of freshwater, its water
consumption is relatively minimal compared with other activities. For
example, in New York, fracking is estimated to consume
approximately nine billions gallons of water a year—a small fraction
113
of the 3.8 trillion total gallons of water used annually. However, as
hydrofracking becomes more common, the strain on the water supply
114
will rapidly become more significant. In the Barnett Shale play,
water usage increased from approximately 700-acre-feet in 2000 to
115
more than 7,000 acre-feet in 2005.

108. See id. (Over the last 150 years, “as many as 300,000 wells have been drilled, an
unknown number of them left behind as hidden holes in the ground.”).
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2006). For example, Pennsylvania requires a permit for
“implementation of erosion and sedimentation controls, including storm water management.”
ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 104, at 36.
110. JACQUELYN PLESS, REGULATING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: STATES TAKE ACTION,
3 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/FrackingPub1210.pdf.
111. CHARLES W. ABDALLA & JOY R. DROHAN, PENN. ST. UNIV., WATER WITHDRAWALS
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARCELLUS SHALE GAS IN PENNSYLVANIA: INTRODUCTION TO
PENNSYLVANIA’S WATER RESOURCES 3 (2010). (“Hydrofracturing a horizontal Marcellus well
may use 4 to 8 million gallons of water, typically within about 1 week. However, based on
experiences in other major U.S. shale gas fields, some Marcellus wells may need to be
hydrofractured several times over their productive life (typically five to twenty years or
more).”).
112. Id.
113. Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333.
114. See, e.g., Michael Clark, Texas Struggles to Manage Hydrofracking Water Use, EARTH
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2011),
http://www.earthtimes.org/energy/texas-struggles-managehydrofracking-water-use/1345/ (articulating that fracking in Texas “currently uses [12 billion]
gallons of water per year and it is expected to climb to [39 billion] by 2030).
115. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 104, at 7.
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116

Utilizing an additional two to eight million gallons of water in a
brief period can strain existing infrastructure and threaten current
117
water uses. Significant water withdrawals can also have negative
effects on municipal water supplies, recreational activities, utilities
118
dependent on flowing water, and aquatic life. Reduced stream flow,
especially in times of drought, can cause degradation of carefully
119
balanced natural habitats. Groundwater supplies can be affected
too. For example, Louisiana’s Office of Conservation has received
120
complaints from landowners that their wells are “going dry.”
Because of the growing concerns regarding the public water supply,
some states have recently enacted requirements that companies
provide proposals for water usage before receiving a permit to begin
121
fracturing operations.
C. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Because natural gas is cleaner burning than both coal and oil,
122
hydrofracking supporters tout natural gas as a “bridge fuel,” and
suggest that the cleaner emissions offset any negative environmental
impacts. The combustion of natural gas emits nearly “two-thirds less
carbon dioxide than coal and one-quarter less than oil when
123
consumed in a typical electric power plant.” Furthermore, the
combustion of natural gas “also emits less particulate matter, sulfur
124
dioxide, and nitrogen dioxides” than both coal and oil.
However, natural gas may not have as strong an impact on the
reduction of greenhouse emissions as previously thought. A 2011
Cornell University study found that shale gas has a significantly larger
greenhouse footprint than conventional gas because methane, a
116. See supra text accompanying note 111.
117. PLESS, supra note 110, at 3.
118. Id.
119. Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333.
120. Hall, supra note 33, at 251.
121. For example, “Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality enacted a rule in
2011 requiring gas companies to provide the proposed total volume of water needed for fracking
operations, complete an online water withdrawal evaluation, and explain the source of their
water before beginning extraction.” Negro, supra note 53, at 6. New York’s DEC regulates “the
rate, timing, and location of water withdrawals through permit conditions.” Gruza, supra note
77, at 10,333.
122. MICHAEL RATNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41543, GLOBAL NATURAL GAS: A
GROWING RESOURCE 1 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41543_
20101222.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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highly potent greenhouse gas, is emitted with the completion of a
125
fracturing job. Methane is the chief component of natural gas, and
methane’s global warming potential is “far greater” than that of CO2,
126
especially in the decades following the gas’s release. In fact, over a
twenty-year period, shale gas, while having fewer emissions due to the
direct combustion, may have a larger greenhouse footprint than both
127
coal and diesel oil because of fugitive methane. It is important to
note that these conclusions have been disputed by other scholars at
Cornell University for “overestimat[ing] the fugitive emissions
128
associated with unconventional gas extraction.”
Nevertheless, recent greenhouse gas projections from the State
Department forecast an eight percent increase in methane release
between 2005 and 2020, with the greatest difference attributed to
129
increases in fugitive methane from the natural gas sector. Currently,
the “Business as Usual” projection shows steady increases in
130
but “shifts in the
greenhouse gas emissions through 2050,
competitive relationship between natural gas and coal in electricity
generation markets” could have large impacts on methane gas
emissions (relatively larger in the natural gas sector) and carbon
131
dioxide emissions (relatively larger in the coal sector).
D. Seismic Disturbance
Structural geologists are concerned that the subsurface
interference associated with hydrofracking could lead to earthquakes
132
by triggering unintended seismic disturbances. Seismic disturbance
is a larger concern in already seismically active areas and fault zones,
as subsurface disruption in these areas is more likely to trigger
133
earthquakes. Of even more concern, subsurface interference could
125. Robert Howarth, Climate Impacts of Shale Gas Development, CORNELL UNIV. (Apr..
19, 2012), available at http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/Marcellus.html.
126. Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 38.
127. Howarth, supra note 125. See also Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 38. (“[T]he
footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater than coal, and perhaps more than twice as great on
the 20-year horizon and is comparable to coal when compared over 100 years.”).
128. Tim Boersma & Corey Johnson, The Shale Gas Revolution: U.S. and EU Policy and
Research Agendas, 29 REV. POL’Y RES. 570, 573 (2012).
129. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 79 (2010).
130. Id. at 77.
131. Id. at 84.
132. See Powers, supra note 2, at 925 (stating that “subsurface interference could . . . trigger
earthquakes”).
133. Eli MacKinnon, Strange Dallas Earthquakes Might be Caused by Fracking, MOTHER
NATURE NETWORK (Oct. 2, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/energy/stories/
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fissure pre-existing subsurface-fault zones, allowing gas migration into
134
aquifers.
According to Dr. Cliff Frohlich, a senior research scientist at the
University of Texas’s Institute for Geophysics, “it is possible that
some of these earthquakes have a natural origin . . . but it is
implausible that all are natural,” as there has been a clustering of the
earthquakes witnessed in the Barnett Shale region within two miles of
135
disposal wells. The underground injection of wastewater is believed
136
to be causing the newfound seismic activity. Before 2008, Dallas,
which sits near the active drilling sites of the Barnett shale play, never
recorded an earthquake stronger than a magnitude three, but the city
has experienced an earthquake of this magnitude every subsequent
137
year, with the exception of 2010. Arkansas has also recently
witnessed an uptick in seismic activity, and because of the correlation
witnessed between seismic activity and underground injection of
wastewater, “the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission has imposed an
138
emergency moratorium on the drilling of new injection wells . . . .”
E. Loss of Pristine Wilderness
In 2011, New York’s Department of Environmental
Conservation issued a Revised Draft Supplemental Generic
139
Environmental Impact Statement,
which stated that exposing
environmentally sensitive areas to the potential adverse impacts of

strange-dallas-earthquakes-might-be-caused-by-fracking (“Faults are everywhere. A lot of them
are stuck, but if you pump water in there, it reduces friction and the fault slips a little.”); see
Terrence Henry, How Fracking Disposal Wells are Causing Earthquakes in Dallas-Fort Worth¸
NPR (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/08/06/ how-frackingdisposal-wells-are-causing-earthquakes-in-dallas-fort-worth/ (“The problem, according to the
new study by Dr. Cliff Frohlich, senior research scientist at the University’s Institute for
Geophysics, is that some of those disposal wells around Dallas-Fort Worth are also on fault
lines.”).
134. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 95, at 13 (the fluids follow the “path of
least resistance” and are “forced upward toward the surface”).
135. Henry, supra note 133.
136. Id.
137. MacKinnon, supra note 133.
138. Campbell Robertson, Arkansas Quake is its Most Powerful in 35 Years, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/us/01earthquakes.html?_%20r=1&hp&_
r=1&.
139. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND
SOLUTION
MINING
REGULATORY
PROGRAM
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ rdsgeisfull0911.pdf.
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140

hydrofracking is one of “the most significant” possible impacts. As
discussed above, the use of water for hydrofracking, especially if the
141
practice becomes even more common, could disturb carefully
142
balanced ecosystems by disrupting stream flow or lake storage.
Consequently, New York prohibits hydrofracking in the Forest
143
Preserve land of the Adirondacks and Catskills.
When the EPA visited an operation in Colorado, researchers
witnessed “areas where patches of grass and trees were turning brown
and dying” in areas that “previously had prolonged normal soil
144
Improperly managed fracturing operations can
conditions.”
145
exacerbate the problems created by surface pollution. For example
in 2009, an operation in the Marcellus Shale, Pennsylvania, only 150
miles northwest of New York City, sent nearly 8,000 gallons of
146
fracking fluid into the wilderness because of failed pipe connections.
The fluid contained LGC-35 CBM, a potentially carcinogenic
lubricant; although tests conducted by the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection concluded that the concentration of the
147
carcinogen was not high enough to be harmful. Conversely, private
experimentation found that there were toxins in the drinking water,
including ethylene glycol, propylene glycol, and toluene in the well
148
water of “almost everybody” living in the area of the spill. A larger
spill, or a spill with a higher concentration of dangerous chemicals,
could be disastrous to the surrounding ecosystem and to human
health.

140. Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333.
141. See, e.g. Sutherland, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing the projected increase of wells in
the Marcellus region).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 117–121.
143. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 139.
144. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE
RESERVOIRs, EPA 816R04003 App. A-2–4, A-11–14 (2004).
145. See Obold, supra note 9, at 481 (stating that improperly managed fracking operations
lead to surface pollution).
146. Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State Regulation,
Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 49, 7 (2010),
available at http://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/files/files/FACULTY/2010okjoltrev49.pdf.
147. See id. (stating that the “concentrations of the chemical in the fracturing fluid were
found to be so diluted that they were harmless”).
148. Toxic Fracking Chemicals Found in Pennsylvania Drinking Water, HERALD DISPATCH
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/briefs/x1988164152/Toxic-frackingchemicals-found-in-Pennsylvania-drinking-water.
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V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HYDROFRACKING
A. The Significance of Shale Gas
A 2010 assessment of the world’s remaining energy supplies,
conducted by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural
149
Resources and the German Mineral Resources Agency, concluded
that approximately 406 billion tons of hydrocarbons remain that can
be extracted with existing technology at an economically practicable
150
cost. The International Energy Agency determined that, in 2009
alone, 8.353 billion tons were used globally, and therefore, at this rate
of consumption, current economically recoverable energy reserves
151
would only last approximately forty-eight years. Seventy-one billion
of the 406 billion tons of recoverable hydrocarbons are locked in
unconventional reserves that require advanced drilling technologies
152
such as hydrofracking. Domestically, “[n]atural gas consumption
153
currently comprises about 23% of the total energy consumption,”
154
and possible increases in demand from retiring coal power plants
155
and increasing residential and industrial uses might increase natural
gas’s importance in America’s energy framework. Without major
technological advancements in renewable, alternative energy sources
that would allow for the complete avoidance of unconventional
hydrocarbon extraction, hydrofracking may be necessary as
conventional energy reserves begin to dwindle.

149. See generally FED. INST. FOR GEOSCIENCES & NAT. RES., ANNUAL REPORT,
RESERVES, RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY OF ENERGY RESOURCES 81, 86 (2010), available
at http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Energie/Downloads/annual_report_2010_en.pdf?__blob
=publicationFile&v=3.
150. Id.
151. Obold, supra note 9, at 475.
152. See id. (writing that “unconventional hydrocarbons require more advanced drilling
technologies both to reach the reserve and to pull the oil or gas to the surface”).
153. Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332.
154. Some experts have “estimated that within 15 years coal might account for 35-40% of
U.S. power generation compared to 48-50% today.” Jonathan Bailey & Henry Lee, North
American Oil and Gas Reserves: Prospects and Policy, (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper
No. 12-039, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148702
&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148702.
155. For example, see Matthew L. Wald, An Airline Fleet Fueled by Natural Gas, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/an-airlinefleet-fueled-by-natural-gas/, for an article about Qatar Airlines opening an airport that will
pump airline fuel derived from natural gas.
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B. Does Hydrofracking Provide a Meaningful Economic Stimulus?
Hydrofracking can prove immensely profitable to economically
depressed areas, as struggling landowners receive a bounty for the
extraction rights, and jobs pertaining to the operation flow into the
156
area. Because the profits from leasing land for hydrofracking go
entirely to the individual whose land is leased, and because the
pollution costs associated with hydrofracking are borne by the entire
157
surrounding community—a classic economic negative externality —
individuals may lease their land for hydrofracking even when the
158
costs to the community outweigh the benefits. However, because
permitting hydrofracking can enable economically depressed areas
(with sizeable natural-gas reserves) to realize infrastructure
improvements, such as improved roads and new agricultural
159
machinery, the negative externality often fails to be accounted for
during the decision-making process. In the Marcellus region, in 2008
alone, fracking operations were valued at $2.3 billion, estimated to
have produced more than 29,000 jobs, and connected to a $240
160
million increase in state and local tax revenue. As the number of
161
sited wells increases, these benefits will undoubtedly increase as
well.
However, the economic benefits of hydrofracking are often
overstated. First, a sizable portion of the money does not flow into
the region: estimates show that only fifty-one percent of the land in
162
the Marcellus is owned by local residents. Second, nearly forty
156. Leasing a single acre can provide the landowner with $180,000 in royalties a year.
Powers, supra note 2, at 927.
157. An externality is a “consequence or side effect of one’s economic activity, causing
another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). More specifically, a negative externality is an “externality that is
detrimental to another, such as water pollution created by a nearby factory.” Id.
158. Pollution, or the possibility of pollution discounted by the percentage of its likelihood,
is considered a negative externality because the social costs are far greater than the costs
experienced by the individual making the decision. Because the rational landowner will
theoretically lease his land up to the point where the benefit of leasing is greater than the cost of
leasing to himself, the individual landowner does not necessarily consider the costs to others
when making the decision, and therefore land may be leased for hydrofracking where the total
costs (including social costs) exceed the benefits of the transaction.
159. Boersma & Johnson, supra note 128, at 572.
160. Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
162. TIMOTHY W. KELSEY ET AL., MARCELLUS SHALE EDUC. & TRAINING CTR.,
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARCELLUS SHALE IN PENNSYLVANIA: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME
IN
2009
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.shaletec.org/docs/
EconomicImpactFINALAugust28.pdf#zoom=75 (“According to our analysis, approximately 51
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163

percent of the workers used are not from the region. Third, existing
socioeconomic separations are amplified due to hydrofracking
because those who financially benefit from leasing their land can
afford to relocate, leaving behind any potential environmental
impacts or health hazards to their former neighbors who did not
164
receive the financial windfall.
Fourth, rapid population and economic growth in “too short a
165
time can prove disastrous.” According to the “boomtown” or
“social disruption” model, as population flourishes, existing
infrastructure is incapable of meeting demand for necessary public
services, such as public schooling, retail inventories, housing, medical
care, and even recreational opportunities required for a positive
166
quality of life. The decreased quality of life leads to a dissatisfied
workforce for hydrofracking operations or other local businesses, and
the “social upheaval and malaise” leads to a decrease in private
167
investment outside of the hydrofracking operation. Moreover, in
small towns that are transforming into “natural gas towns,” local
governments “seldom have adequate resources or the experienced
staff required to research the issues that arise or preventatively
allocate resources to deal with expected problems before they
168
occur.” In fact, at “growth rates higher than 15%,” institutional
169
breakdowns are described as “typical.”

percent of the land in Marcellus counties is owned by residents within the county, 25 percent is
owned by someone living elsewhere in Pennsylvania, and 7.7 percent is owned by people living
outside of Pennsylvania. The remaining 17 percent is owned by the public sector, primarily the
Commonwealth.”).
163. Boersma & Johnson, supra note 128, at 572.
164. See Powers, supra note 2, at 928 n.161. (discussing how potential pollution can lead to
the over-utilization of hydrofracking).
165. Matthew T. Dubois, The Natural Gas Explosion: Boom of Bust for New York’s
Economy and Environment? 8 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://law.buffalo.edu/
Academic_Programs_And_Research/submenu/conEvironLaw/dubois12.pdf.
166. Jeffrey Jacquet, Energy Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale
Local Governments & Rural Communities 7 (The N.E. Reg’l Ctr. for Rural Dev., Working
Paper No. 43, 2009), available at http://nercrd.psu.edu/Publications/rdppapers/rdp43.pdf.
167. See Dubois, supra note 165, at 9 (“The social upheaval and malaise drives [off] private
investors and prevents investment in commerce, housing, or other private sector needs. The
inadequacy of public and private sector services feeds back into the cycle, degrading the quality
of life and destabilizing the workforce, which leads in turn to a reduction in services.”).
168. Id. at 9–10.
169. Id. at 10.
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Whereas the state profits from an increase in taxes, these
boomtowns experience short-term economic benefits and subsequent
recessions when the drilling construction phase is completed and the
production phase, which requires much less labor and local resources,
171
begins.
These economic downturns are worsened by local
investment predicated on the idea that the short-term economic
172
benefits of hydrofracking will continue. In a 2009 Penn State
University study, “[a]lmost all of the boomtown communities that
were researched during [the] 1970s and early 1980s went through a
173
severe economic downturn as the construction . . . was completed.”
The boom-and-bust cycle may be exacerbated in less gas-rich areas
where the construction-withdrawal cycle is much shorter.
On the other hand, the practice of hydrofracking has affected
174
domestic energy prices, in part because the increased supply of gas
is decreasing the demand for other fuel sources as industry begins to
switch to natural gas as a power source. AT&T recently vowed to
175
convert its 76,000-vehicle fleet to run on natural gas. Furthermore,
many, including T. Boone Pickens, have suggested that hydrofracking
can help lead the United States to energy independence, and
therefore they support tax incentives for the conversion to natural gas
176
vehicular infrastructure.
VI. WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY SHOULD REGULATE
HYDROFRACKING
A. Should Hydrofracking Regulation be Left to the States?
Some argue that because hydrofracking is a localized activity
with few interstate impacts, hydrofracking regulation should be

170. See Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332 (discussing hydrofracking’s relationship to
increased state taxes in the Marcellus region).
171. Dubois, supra note 165, at 11.
172. See id. (discussing that local “investments are often predicated upon projected growth
rates that make the erroneous assumption that the initial natural gas well construction phase
will continue indefinitely”).
173. Jacquet, supra note 166, at 24.
174. Inflation adjusted U.S. electricity prices have dropped from approximately thirteen
cents per kilowatt-hour in 1990 to just below twelve cents. See Inflation Adjusted Average U.S.
Electricity
Prices
Graph,
INFLATIONDATA.COM,
http://inflationdata.com/articles/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Inflation-Adjusted-Electricity.jpg (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
175. Leah Harnack, Ending our Oil Dependence, MASS TRANSIT (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10207824/ending-our-oil-dependence.
176. Id.
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178

reserved for the states. For instance, as previously mentioned,
migration of gas into drinking water presents more risks in areas that
are relatively water-rich, more geologically brittle, and have a higher
degree of groundwater connectivity. Because states have differing
179
geologies and needs, regulation is better left to the different states.
This argument is misguided for several reasons.
First, whereas shale is relatively resistant to underground fluid
180
migration, intrastate extraction can lead to interstate environmental
problems, as pollutants flow downstream or seep into aquifers
181
spanning multiple states. Pollutants can reach aquifers in multiple
182
ways, such as through poorly designed water wells or via seismic
183
activity that cracks pre-existing fault lines. Concerns with interstate
pollution are heightened in regions with more groundwater
connectivity and non-fracking-related seismic activity. Second,
geologists are experts at rock formations and therefore, whether a
geologist works for a given state or for the federal government, he or
she will be equally capable at studying the land formations and
deciding upon a proper baseline or minimum threshold that states can
then build upon. Additionally, national standards do not necessarily
need to be equivalent to one-size-fits-all regulation. For example,
requirements could differ by rock permeability or by vertical distance
from potable water. Third, although socioeconomic situations of
states differ, because of the negative externalities associated with
pollution and concerns regarding intertemporal decision-making,
state legislation balancing short-term economic gains and long-term
environmental costs will lead to suboptimal results. This topic is
184
discussed in greater detail below.

177. See Powers, supra note 2, at 953 (calling hydrofracking a “land-based activity without
any obvious interstate impacts”).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77.
179. See Powers, supra note 2, at 954 (stating that “given the extensive private property
interests involved in hydrofracking, local geographic, socioeconomic, geological, and
hydrological differences make state regulation arguably more appropriate”).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
181. For example, the Ogallala Aquifer spans eight states (South Dakota, Nebraska,
Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas) and environmental groups
have raised concern that hydrofracking could “jeopardizethe integrity of the Ogallala Aquifer,”
on which many farmers depend. Tim Carpenter, Hydrofracking Exposes Controversy in Kansas,
TOPEKA CAPITAL J. (Sept. 5, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2011-0905/hydrofracking-exposes-controversy-kansas.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 104–106.
183. See supra text accompanying note 134.
184. This topic is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.B.
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Because many sectors of the oil and natural gas industry were
exempted from environmental regulations with the Energy Policy Act
185
of 2005, one could argue that the “Halliburton loophole” provides
evidence that the federal government is incapable of comprehensive
federal legislation. However, the federal government has proven
capable of comprehensive federal environmental regulation before.
The federal government already has sweeping environmental
regulations in place, such as the CWA, SDWA, CAA, and CERCLA.
For example, the EPA and Transportation Department already
regulate greenhouse gas emissions for automobiles pursuant to the
186
187
CAA. Because of methane’s potency as a greenhouse gas, the
EPA should remove the natural gas industry’s exemption from the
188
CAA aggregating policies, and aggregate emissions that occur from
drilling operations. As California can set its own vehicular emissions
standards, other states should similarly be waived from preemption if
189
they wish to increase environmental protections. Furthermore,
there is no reason why the environmental impacts of coal mining
should be scrutinized more carefully by the federal government than
190
those of natural gas exploration.
Moreover, the federal government’s previous failure to get
involved in the hydrofracking debate is partly attributable to Dick
Cheney’s actions as the chair of the national Energy Policy
191
Development Group. If the federal government were to establish a
comprehensive federal hydrofracking baseline in the future, one
would hope that they would choose a person with a more neutral
mindset to chair the task force. Because of the negative publicity
afforded to the “Halliburton loophole,” it is unlikely that such a
biased chair would be picked the second time around. With a more

185. See supra Part III.A.
186. John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cars, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html?_r=0.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 122–128.
188. See supra text accompanying note 37.
189. In 2009, the EPA granted California “a waiver of Clean Air Act preemption to enforce
its greenhouse gas emission standards” after the waiver was originally denied in 2005. California
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744 (July 8, 2009),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-07-08/pdf/E9-15943.pdf.
190. See generally Strict Regulations Govern Coal Mining, AM. COAL FOUND.,
http://www.ket.org/trips/coal/agsmm/agsmmregs.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (discussing the
strict regulations governing coal mining).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 21–27.
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impartial chair, federal action will be less biased and more able to
overcome the barriers preventing efficient state balancing of the
tension between energy and environmental issues.
Many gas-rich states, as well as gas-industry lobbyists, argue that
state regulation is adequate because fracking operations have
presented few problems and unnecessarily imposing federal
regulation would burden the industry by increasing costs of
192
permitting and slowing production. However, this argument ignores
the potentially significant long-term environmental costs that come
with hydrofracking. Whereas pollutants in small doses may do little
harm, as pollutants aggregate, there may be a more cognizable, longterm impact. Indeed, the EPA, in its most recent evaluation of
hydrofracking in Pavillion, Wyoming in 2011, discussed previously,
concluded that hydrofracking had led to pollution of the water
supply—providing bona fide evidence that hydrofracking can
contribute to environmental degradation. Because the EPA only
made this conclusion very recently, other incidences of pollution will
likely be attributed to hydrofracking in the coming years as more
studies are conducted and pollution aggregates in the water supply.
After all, the EPA’s stance on hydrofracking changed dramatically
from 2004 (when the agency concluded that fracking posed little
threat to the environment) to 2011 (when the EPA concluded that
fracking had contaminated the Wyoming water supply).
B. The Federal Government Should be the Entity Charged with Setting
Baseline Standards
Individuals have a strong tendency to discount heavily—and
therefore undervalue—future outcomes when compared to
193
immediate impacts. Intertemporal discounting has a strong impact
on the clash between economic and environmental interests. In
political elections, the immediacy of hydrofracking’s perceived
economic impacts will lure political fervor when compared to the
more nebulous environmental costs. For several reasons, the federal
government will be better than other levels of government at

192. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (SDWA):
SELECTED REGULATED AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 24 (2010), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34201_20100727.pdf.
193. See generally Dilip Soman et al., The Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why
are Distant Events Valued Differently from Proximal Ones?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 347
(2005), available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/ShaneFrederick/Marketing%20Letters.pdf
(discussing and explaining intertemporal discounting).
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safeguarding against the problems of intertemporal and
intergenerational decision-making.
The federal environmental bureaucracy is farther removed from
the electorate and therefore the federal government will be less
pressured than local governments by the perceived economic benefits
of specific drilling proposals. For example, in rural areas where the
citizenry clamors for more drilling and less environmental regulation
because of the perceived economic boost, local legislators will have
little choice but to succumb to the population’s wishes if they desire
reelection. This pressure will likely be felt even if hydrofracking
operations pose a threat to the long-term economic health of an area,
194
as suggested by the social disruption model.
The federal
government is more insulated from these pressures, because states
more concerned with the environmental impacts of hydrofracking—
such as those posing statewide moratoriums—will provide support for
environmental regulation. For example, congressional Democrats are
currently pressuring the EPA to continue research on the connection
195
between hydrofracking and water contamination. Having both sides
of the issue heard will help buttress against bias in any direction.
Whereas federal regulatory agencies are also susceptible to political
196
pressure, the federal government will feel less pressure because of
the political make-up of the legislature. Rasmussen reported that in
August 2012, 37.6% of the United States identified as Republican and
197
33.3% as Democrat, but many states tend to have political
inclinations that are less balanced than the United States as a whole.
In general, state and local governments are “particularly
198
vulnerable to industry and union pressures.” Industrial interest
groups, such as the energy companies supporting hydrofracking, tend
to be more vocal than their counterparts because they have a large

194. See supra text accompanying notes 165–81.
195. John C. Rudolf, Pressure Grows for Answers on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/pressure-grows-for-answers-on-fracking/.
196. See e.g., Press Release, U.S. House of Rep. Energy & Commerce Committee, Facing
Bipartisan Congressional Pressure, EPA Finally Clears Offshore Permits (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/facing-bipartisan-congressional-pressure-epafinally-clears-offshore-permits (announcing that the EPA finally conceded under bipartisan
pressure and granted permits for exploration in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea after a five-year
bureaucratic delay).
197. Partisan Trends, RASMUSSEN REP. (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/politics/mood_of_america/partisan_trends.
198. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977).
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economic stake in any prescribed regulation, and therefore will be
willing to spend significant amounts of money to avoid increased
199
regulation or pollution-control costs. Those fighting for increased
environmental regulation tend to have less of a monetary stake in the
outcome, and therefore local government is likely to place less
emphasis on environmental concerns.
The disproportionate pressures felt by state and local
governments are intensified because of a collective action problem—
opposition to environmental degradation is shared among the masses,
with each individual having a small personal interest in environmental
quality, and facing formidable transaction costs associated with
expressing that interest. In contrast, industrial interest groups have
200
large, concentrated interests, so coordination is less of a problem.
201
The “tragedy of the commons” from the field of economics and the
202
“social loafing” phenomena from social psychology prescribe that
individuals are less likely to act (or refrain from acting) when their
individual actions would have a miniscule impact on the outcome of a
larger group. For example, the aggregating effects of methane gas on
climate change are experienced by everyone, but each individual
fracturing operation has minimal costs to any particular individual on
the margin. Over time, once all drilling operations are aggregated, the
203
amount of methane in the atmosphere can have dramatic effects.
The federal government is the better entity to solve collective
action problems because they are better shielded from strong local
political pressures and have the ability to assess the entire nation’s
204
present and future interests. The nexus between energy extraction

199. See id.
200. See id.
201. The tragedy of the commons “describes how individual actors are driven by short-term
self-interest to pollute a commonly held resource even where each individual knows the group’s
collective actions will eventually destroy or seriously damage it.” Powers, supra note 2, at 931.
202. Social loafing is defined as “the tendency of individual group members to reduce their
work effort as groups increase in size when performance is needed in a group.” J. DAN
ROTHWELL, IN MIXED COMPANY: COMMUNICATING IN SMALL GROUPS 83 (3d ed. 1997). This
applies to the hydrofracking context because the group of those that may be affected by the
possible environmental impacts of hydrofracking are spread over the entire population, while
those receiving a large profit from the fracturing operation are smaller in number.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 126–128. Climate change may start having more
noticeable impacts on society, as most of the models from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change project exponential growth patterns. INTERGOVT. PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 66–80 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf.
204. Powers, supra note 2, at 932.
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and environmental degradation is especially influenced by these
economic and psychological phenomena because environmental
concerns are less noticeable on the margin. In other areas, such as
labor or social-welfare policies, those adversely affected by any proindustry regulations will have more of a voice, because cognizable
effects will tend to be more clustered in urban areas (rather than rural
areas as with hydrofracking) and employment and health concerns
may be more relatable and invoke more empathy. Everyone might
become sick or fall on hard times, but not everyone will be affected
by the water quality in Pavillion, Wyoming or the diminution of
pristine wilderness in Colorado.
One of the major arguments in favor of federal regulation when
environmental and industrial interests clash is the “race-to-the205
bottom” paradigm —the theory that if the federal government fails
to get involved, states will lower regulations in order to attract
206
business inside their borders. Because states will be forced to
compete, environmental regulations will be lowered to suboptimal
207
levels. However, because hydraulic fracturing operations are not
zero-sum, one might expect the “race-to-the-bottom” to have a
smaller impact, if any, because rational companies will drill wherever
the marginal revenue of the action exceeds the marginal cost—
wherever a profit can be made. The chief decisions regarding where
to drill are (a) where is the gas located and (b) whether the gas can be
extracted at a profit.
Theoretical economics aside, empirical evidence suggests that
state officials may unnecessarily lower standards to attract industry
208
because of political pressure. Especially in a weak economy, or in
any area experiencing some level of unwanted underemployment, the
209
economy tends to be the most important political issue. As

205. See Powers, supra note 2, at 932–33 (explaining that “[t]he ‘race-to-the-bottom’
paradigm has also been used to defend federal intervention in environmental issues.”).
206. Id. at 933.
207. One way to simplify the “race-to-the-bottom” problem in the hydrofracking context is
to view each state as a perfect substitute for another state. If one state has lower environmental
regulations, then it will be more profitable to drill there and that state will experience all of the
economic benefits of hydrofracking. Because of this, states will continue to lower their
regulation in order to avoid losing the economic benefits of hydrofracking.
208. For a more in-depth discussion on the race-to-the-bottom, see generally Kirsten H.
Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
209. See, e.g., Joe V. Kanel, Exit Polls: Top Issues for Voters, CNN (Nov. 6, 2012, 7:43 PM),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/06/exit-polls-top-issues-for-voters (describing that in
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discussed above, the electorate is likely to favor short-term economic
benefits compared to nebulous, long-term environmental costs.
Moreover, pollution, which when aggregated can have severe
210
impacts, can be hard to notice on the margin.
The “free-rider problem” also suggests that states might not
factor in pollution costs that fall outside their borders (even if caused
within the state), and therefore state governance worsens the
pollution negative-externality. Examples of interstate pollutants are
greenhouse gas emissions from fugitive methane and water
contamination that can cross state lines. Therefore, current state
legislators might feel more compelled to lower regulations out of fear
of political backlash if the public perceives not doing so as unwanted
inaction. The federal bureaucracy, in providing a regulatory baseline
for all states, would be insulated from these pressures.
Even in New York, a gas-rich state with relatively more
regulations than its peers, hydrofracking faces “underprotection” due
to inadequate enforcement capacity and “its failure to anticipate
211
cumulative impacts.” For example, New York’s regulatory scheme
has proven incapable of ensuring that fracking flowback is sufficiently
212
clean to meet SDWA and RCRA requirements. Hydrofracking
regulation should reside with the federal government because of its
better ability to alleviate the “race-to-the-bottom” and collectionaction problems, and because if left to state governance,
underprotection is likely (due to political trade-offs and cognitive
barriers to more effective decision-making). Notably, the governor of
Wyoming delayed the release of the EPA’s findings in the Pavillion
213
study in order to “coordinate an ‘all-out-press’ against the EPA,”
suggesting that states are failing to adequately balance economic
benefits and environmental costs.

the 2012 presidential election, “early exit poll results [showed that] the economy [was] the
number one issue on voter’s minds”).
210. “Stock” pollution refers to the amalgamation of pollutants that the environment
cannot readily absorb. With each additional pollutant, it will be hard to perceive the difference
on the margin, however, amassing substantial pollutants can have severe impacts. See Kenneth
R. Szulczyk, Lecture #5 – Pollution: Precautionary Principle, http://www.oocities.org/szulczyk/
lessons/environmental_05.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
211. See Powers, supra note 2, at 954 (explaining that “an analysis of New York’s
experience with hydrofracking to date suggests that state primacy may well result in underprotection and even hamper production activity”).
212. Id.
213. Wyoming Pushed EPA to Delay Study on Fracking, supra note 94.

Garmezy (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2013]

BALANCING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING’S IMPACTS

5/7/2013 11:16 AM

435

C. However, Local Governments Should Have the Ability to Zone Out
Fracking
Many municipalities and counties have decided to ban
214
hydrofracking completely, and whether the local governments have
the ability to do so legally depends on the state’s regulatory
215
framework. For example, in 2011, Morgantown, West Virginia
banned hydrofracking within a mile of city limits. However, this ban
was struck down as being preempted by state law, as the industry is
regulated exclusively by the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection, which had issued a permit for the
216
operation.
Currently, preemption battles are underway in New York as
217
well, with New York’s lower courts, unlike those in West Virginia,
tending to uphold municipal bans of hydrofracking. Proponents of
preemption (that is, of preventing local fracking bans in New York)
argue that “the [l]egislature’s intent [was] to streamline energy
development in the state and protect the economic rights of property
owners who seek to cash in on their underground natural
218
resources.” However, supporters of a municipality’s ability to ban
fracking argue that “the law preempts local governments from
regulating how oil and gas companies operate”; the purpose is
regulating the process to keep it safe, not to unilaterally decide where
219
to drill. In 1987, the Court of Appeals of New York decided in Frew
220
Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of Carroll that “[s]tricter local
standards” for mining activities “would be consistent with the
221
statute’s over-all aim of protecting the environment.” Pursuant to
the court’s decision in Frew Run, in Anschutz Exploration Corp. v.

214. For example, in the Marcellus region, dozens of municipalities, including Buffalo,
Ithaca, Geneva, Pittsburgh, and Cresson, have banned hydrofracking. Negro, supra note 53, at
10.
215. Id.
216. See generally N.E. Natural Energy, LLC v. Morgantown, WV, No. 11-c-411
(Monongalia Cty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (order granting summary judgment).
217. For example, Dryden has passed zoning laws banning hydrofracking, but the ban is
being contested in court. Negro, supra note 53, at 10.
218. Peter Mantius, Dryden and Middlefield Fracking Bans Tested, D.C. BUREAU (Nov. 11,
2011),
http://www.dcbureau.org/201111116473/natural-resources-news-service/dryden-andmiddlefield-fracking-bans-tested.html.
219. Id.
220. 524 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
221. Id. at 133.
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222

Town of Dryden, a local court recently decided that the Town of
Dryden, New York had the power to ban hydrofracking through
223
zoning laws.
Similarly, the Town of Middlefield’s ban of
hydrofracking was upheld in Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of
224
225
Middlefield, because New York’s supersession clause does not
preempt a municipality from “enacting land use regulation within the
226
confines of its jurisdiction.” Currently, some states with less clearly
defined municipal roles are considering whether or not to pass
227
legislation that would prohibit municipal banning of hydrofracking.
Many of these local battles over hydrofracking policy can be
attributed to the fact that, with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the
federal government stepped away from hydrofracking regulation,
leaving regulation over the majority of the drilling operation solely to
the states. Federal governmental regulation could provide for
municipal rights and grant local governments the legal authority to
place moratoriums on hydrofracking. As discussed previously, many
states may have implemented energy policies that fail to adequately
balance the benefits of hydrofracking with the long-term
environmental costs (for example, many states have failed to regulate
228
fracking fluid containing diesel pursuant to the SDWA). Concern
over hydrofracking’s environmental impacts is mounting, and the
effects of a statewide failure to assess accurately the costs of
hydrofracking should not be thrust upon unwilling municipalities.
A frequent argument proffered for preemption, and against
municipal control, is that providing municipalities with the power to
229
zone-out hydrofracking will lead to NIMBYism.
However,
NIMBYism in the hydrofracking context is not necessarily bad, as the
most likely effect would be to push hydrofracking away from more
222. 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
223. Id. at 474.
224. 943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
225. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2011) (“The provisions of this
article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and
solution mining industries . . .”).
226. Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
227. For example, Pennsylvania just passed legislation expressly preempting “local
ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate oil and gas well operations regulated by this
chapter.” S.B. 1100, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.B. 1950, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011)
228. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34.
229. NIMBY stands for “not in my backyard; See Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being
Green”: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 835, 889 (2010) (describing NIMBYism as a common reason for preemption in the
environmental context).
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urban areas (which tend to have a more diversified economy) to more
rural areas (which tend to have more of a resource-based economy
230
and will therefore be more welcome to drilling operations). Using a
231
purely utilitarian lens, if the benefits of hydrofracking are assumed
232
similar in rural and urban areas, and there are assumed to be less
pollution costs in rural areas because of the less dense population,
then fracking would return more social profit in more rural areas.
Municipalities in rural areas should be afforded this choice as well,
and as long as the overwhelming majority does not decide to ban
drilling (which is unlikely because many localities advocate for the
economic impact of hydrofracking and more residents of New York
233
currently support hydrofracking than oppose the practice), then
America will not be thrust into a national energy crisis. After all,
before the hydrofracking explosion began in 2006, hydrofracking did
not constitute a major portion of domestic energy production.
Nevertheless, local governments are unlikely to have a significant
effect on the national energy supply, as the majority of rural regions
are unlikely to zone-out hydrofracking completely, and therefore
natural gas will still be injected into the national energy supply.
Furthermore, one of the main benefits attributed to
hydrofracking, localized economic growth, will not come to fruition if
a municipality decides to zone out hydrofracking. If a municipality
conducts its own cost-benefit analysis, and decides that the estimated
costs are higher than the estimated benefits, then the municipality
should have the power to ban hydrofracking. If the municipality views
the fracturing operation as a net loss, then there is no localized
economic benefit accrued—economic concerns encompass more than

230. See Powers, supra note 2, at 946 n.204 (describing that in the natural gas context,
zoning “provides a limited tool” and that most fracking will “occur in rural, rather than
municipal areas”).
231. It is important to note that utilitarianism should not be used as the only consideration,
regulators and decision makers should also consider environmental justice and socioeconomic
concerns.
232. This is an over-simplification as the benefits will depend on factors going to the
profitability of the well, such as the amount of the resource being extracted and the ease of
extraction.
233. See, e.g., Associated Press, Poll: More Support Hydrofracking than Oppose in NY,
PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Dec. 6, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.pressconnects.com/viewart/
20121206/NEWS10/312060032/Poll-more-support-hydrofracking-than-oppose-NY (last visited
Dec. 10, 2012) (finding that in New York, “42 percent support hydrofracking” and another “36
percent oppose it”).

Garmezy (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2013 11:16 AM

438

[Vol. XXIII:405

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

234

mere monetary concerns. Accordingly, municipalities should have
more tools and should be able to increase environmental regulation
(on top of what is mandated at the state or federal level). After all,
some of “the most sophisticated and effective regulations of shale
235
drilling” have been implemented by local governments.
Consequently, municipalities should be vested with the power to
236
regulate noise and light pollution. This would allow hydrofracking
to occur, while helping to mitigate the pollution externality. All of the
arguments favoring stronger municipal regulation apply equally to
state governments.
VII: CONCLUSION: ENFORCEMENT MUST ALSO BE IMPROVED
Drafting comprehensive federal hydrofracking regulations is not
the only step required to mitigate the environmental impacts and
health concerns associated with hydrofracking. Enforcement must
also be increased. The Penn Environment Research and Policy
Center discovered that “of the 4,596 fracking sites operating in
Pennsylvania between 2008 and 2011, companies violated
237
Because the fines are not
environmental laws 3,355 times.”
substantial enough to act as an effective deterrent, companies view
them as a simple business expense, leaving landowners to suffer the
“decimated property values,” polluted air, and contaminated water
238
left behind after a violation. In fact, having fines that are too small
might actually increase the undesirable behavior. Having the fine
takes the framing of the decision out of a moral setting and into

234. See generally Peter Lewin, Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability, 2
CATO
J.
205
(1982),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj2n1/cj2n1-6.pdf (describing “the neoclassical social-cost
approach to problems of pollution.”).
235. Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 34. Various municipalities in Texas have regulated
“setbacks, well locations, green completions, closed loops systems, compressor locations,
pipelines, waste disposal, truck traffic and noise regulation.” Id.
236. For example, Collier Township in Pennsylvania sets minimum ambient noise levels
dependent on the time of day and the stage of the operation.
Prior to the commencement of Oil or Gas Well drilling activities, or in the case of
other mineral removal, the actual commencement of mining activity, no construction
activities involving excavation of, alteration to or repair work on any access road to the
site of the mineral removal or upon an Oil or Gas Well site, other site of mineral
removal, shall be performed during the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
COLLIER TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE 592 § 1703.29.r (2011).
237. Frances Beinecke, Fracking Operations Run Roughshod over Pennsylvania
Homeowners, NRDC STAFF BLOG (Sept. 26, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/
blogs/fbeinecke/fracking_operations_run_roughs.html.
238. Id.
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monetary one, which may cause a corporation to engage in a costbenefit analysis, and when the fines are too small, decrease
239
environmental compliance. Because the energy industry titans are
not often looked upon as moral bastions, larger monetary fines or
240
criminal sanctions, depending on the violation, should be imposed.

239. For example, in a study conducted in Haifa, Israel, economists found that the
occurrence of parents picking up their children late more than doubled once a small monetary
fine was imposed for tardiness. For the study, see Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a
Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
240. If no fines were in place, it is unlikely that morals would effectively govern
hydrofracking without any form of tangible penalties.

